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On March 30, 2010, the Supreme Court decided Jones v Harris As-
sociates,' an appeal from an opinion written by Judge Frank Easter-
brook.' Easterbrook has a remarkable record when the Supreme
Court has reviewed his opinions, and the Jones decision was a rare
rebuke. He is twice as likely to be affirmed as other courts of appeals
judges-the Court has affirmed him nearly 65 percent of the time,'
compared with an average of about 35 percent for all courts of ap-
peals judges.4
One reason for Easterbrook's performance at the Court may be
his judicial approach.! A major theme of Easterbrook's jurisprudence
is fidelity to rules and a relatively narrow conception of the role of the
court.! For instance, Easterbrook is regarded as a stickler for adhering
closely to jurisdictional limitations on the power of courts and for re-
sisting attempts by judges to short-circuit the Federal Rules of Civil
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 130 S Ct 1418 (2010).
2 Jones v Harris Associates, 527 F3d 627 (7th Cir 2008), vacd and remd, 130 S Ct 1418 (2010).
3 The Court has affirmed ten Easterbrook opinions and reversed only five. Two were
vacated and remanded.
4 See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Inferring the Winning Party in
the Supreme Court from the Pattern of Questioning at OralArgument, 39 J Legal Stud *6 (forthcom-
ing 2010), online at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1414317 (visited June 27, 2010). This result does not
change if we compare Easterbrook with a subset of courts of appeals judges who have similar te-
nure and experience to Judge Easterbrook. A peer group of twelve courts of appeals judges (com-
prised of Judges Bruce Selya, Dennis Jacobs, Anthony Scirica, Harvie Wilkinson, Edith Jones, Dan-
ny Boggs, Richard Posner, Roger Wollman, Stephen Reinhardt, Deanell Tacha, Edward Carnes, and
Douglas Ginsburg-one judge from every circuit) is affirmed by the Supreme Court just 34 percent
of the time, compared with nearly 65 percent for Easterbrook. Overall, peer judges are reversed six
times for every one thousand opinions they write, compared to just three times for Judge Easter-
brook. Data on file with author.
5 This may be, in part, because Easterbrook's approach aligns with the majority of the
current Court, but his success stands out against his peer group, which is mostly composed of
judges also appointed by President Ronald Reagan.
6 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533,539-44,
552 (1983) (recommending a "meta-rule" of statutory construction that calls for "construction"
only when the statute either explicitly addresses the issue before the court or instructs judges or
administrators to find their own solution to the matter). See also generally David A. Strauss,
Statutes' Domains and Judges' Prerogatives, 77 U Chi L Rev 1261 (2010).
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Procedure. In Vincent v City Colleges of Chicago,' Easterbrook
scolded a district court judge for granting a motion to dismiss based
on the failure of the plaintiff to make certain factual allegations: "It is
disappointing to see a federal district judge dismiss a complaint for
failure to adhere to a fact-pleading model that federal practice abro-
gated almost 70 years ago."' Easterbrook expressed sympathy for the
district court's desire "to get rid at the earliest opportunity of claims
that do not seem likely to pan out," but noted, "Rule 12(b)(6) does not
serve this function."' For Easterbrook, the rules are the rules, and no-
tions of efficiency must yield to them.
This conservative view of the judiciary is a major theme of his ju-
risprudence, and it is evident in the recent decision involving Chica-
go's gun ban and the question of whether the Second Amendment is
incorporated against the states.o During oral argument, Judge Easter-
brook expressed sympathy for the position of the National Rifle As-
sociation that the amendment be incorporated, but deferred to the
Supreme Court, noting that such a decision is "above our grade level.""
Easterbrook explicitly refused to follow the Ninth Circuit, which ef-
fectively overruled the Supreme Court precedents on point," noting
that this "may be [their] attitude ... but it's not ours."l3 There is some
evidence that this difference in attitude matters: the Ninth Circuit has
the worst track record at the Supreme Court among courts of appeals,1
7 485 F3d 919 (7th Cir 2007).
8 Id at 924.
9 Id.
10 See National Rifle Association of America, Inc v City of Chicago, 567 F3d 856, 857 (7th
Cir 2009), cert granted as McDonald v City of Chicago, 130 S Ct 48 (2009). See also generally
Richard A. Epstein, NRA v City of Chicago: Does the Second Amendment Bind Frank Easter-
brook?, 77 U Chi L Rev 997 (2010).
11 Oral Argument, National Rifle Association ofAmerica, Inc v City of Chicago, Nos 08-4241,
08-4243, 08-4244, 00:04-08 (7th Cir May 26, 2009), online at http://www.ca7.uscourtsgov/fdocs/
docs.fwx?dname=arg (visited Mar 17,2010).
12 See Nordyke v King, 563 F3d 439, 446-48, 457 n 16 (9th Cir 2009) (avoiding three Su-
preme Court precedents).
13 Oral Argument, National Rifle Association at 00:11:13 (cited in note 11).
14 During the 2008-2009 term, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in fifteen out of six-
teen cases, or 94 percent of the time. See Carol J. Williams, High Court Has Eye on 9th Circuit,
LA Times A3 (June 29, 2009) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has exceeded the average rate of
reversal among the circuits in eight of the last ten years). This compares with an average of about
65 percent for all courts of appeals from 1946 to 2004. See Lee A. Epstein, et al, The Supreme
Court Compendium: Data, Decisions; & Developments 244-45 (CQ 4th ed 2007) (providing data
showing that the Supreme Court's reversal rate between 1946 and 2004 was almost always be-
tween 50 and 75 percent). See also Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statisti-
cal Study of Judicial Quality, 29 J Legal Stud 711, 713-14 (2000) (showing a statistically signifi-
cant difference between the rate of summary reversals in the Ninth Circuit and other circuits
between 1985 and 1997).
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and its judge in the Easterbrook peer group, Judge Stephen Reinhardt,
is thirteen times more likely to be reversed than Easterbrook."
If Jones v Harris Associates" were an expression of Easterbrook's
judicial conservatism, we might have thought it would survive Court
review. But Jones is not about Easterbrook following the rules; in fact,
it seems to be just the opposite. Jones rejects longstanding and well-
established law regarding the compensation of mutual fund advisers in
order to throw out cases earlier in the process in the name of econom-
ic efficiency. At first blush, it looks more Reinhardt than Easterbrook.
We should not be surprised that Easterbrook, a pioneer of the law and
economics movement, believes courts should try to apply economic
theory to legal decisionmaking, but this tendency seems in tension
with his rule-following instincts. Jones seems like a case in which Eas-
terbrook's warm embrace of notice pleading (as seen in Vincent) was
disregarded in favor of his economic theory about the pay of mutual
fund advisers. But this is not exactly what was going on in Jones.
This Essay will show why Jones was consistent with both themes
of Easterbrook's jurisprudence. The opinion deploys classic law and
economics reasoning, relying on incentives and markets in ways other
courts have not. But, I will argue, the opinion does not blatantly disre-
gard the rules in the way Easterbrook accused the district court of
doing in Vincent. The Court believed otherwise. It affirmed the Gar-
tenberg standard Easterbrook rejected as representing "something of
a consensus" among the lower courts and "correct in its basic formula-
tion."" I will argue that this result, while not unreasonable, was not as
desirable as the Court seems to believe nor was it necessary under
existing Court precedents.
The statutory command Easterbrook interpreted in Jones-that
advisers owe a fiduciary duty to investors with respect to pay -is not a
rigid rule in the same way as Rule 12(b)(6) or diversity jurisdiction. To
be sure, when asked to give meaning to "fiduciary," Easterbrook could
simply have followed the precedents (from other circuits). But it is a
rather cramped view of the judicial role to expect that broad stand-
ards, like the one in Jones, prevent courts from interpreting the words
based on theoretical or practical considerations. This is especially true,
15 Reinhardt's reversal rate is about 4 out of every 100 opinions, and, conditional on certi-
orari being granted, prevails at the Court only 16 percent of the time. Data on file with author.
Consider Matt Rees, The Judge the Supreme Court Loves to Overturn, The Weekly Standard
(May 5, 1997), available online at http://www.theweeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/
000/001/414ilyss.asp (visited Feb 24, 2010) ("Reinhardt has been heard to say, 'They can't catch
'em all."').
16 527 F3d 627 (7th Cir 2008), vacd and remd, 130 S Ct 1418 (2010).
17 Jones, 130 S Ct at 1425-26.
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as we will see, because the interpretation Easterbrook gave was con-
sistent with other usages of the same language. There was no reason to
think Easterbrook was not following the rules when he applied the
fiduciary law about how other agents are compensated to the question
of how investment advisers are compensated, when all the statute says
is that advisers are fiduciaries.
Judge Easterbrook's opinion also followed the rules about plead-
ing, but not ones that he likes. At first, Jones seems at odds with the
approach Easterbrook took in Vincent, since an effect of this approach
is to promote a merits-collapsing approach similar to the one Easter-
brook rejected there and has consistently ridiculed as lawless.'9 But
although Easterbrook does not acknowledge it, his decision in Jones
follows directly from a Supreme Court precedent-Bell Atlantic Corp
v Twombly-issued three weeks after Vincent. In Twombly, the Court
implicitly amended" the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to permit
courts to dispose of certain types of cases earlier in the litigation to
avoid the expense of litigation and the frivolous cases higher costs
create.2 This Essay will use both theory and some back-of-the-
envelope calculations of the costs of this type of litigation to show why
Jones is one of those certain types of cases.2 Despite Easterbrook's
18 See Vincent, 485 F3d at 923-24.
19 See, for example, Simpson v Nickel, 450 F3d 303, 305 (7th Cir 2006) (remarking that the
district court's treatment of the case "went wrong at the first step: the belief that complaints must
lay out facts corresponding to every 'element' of a legal theory").
20 550 US 544 (2007).
21 Precisely because the Supreme Court has the power to amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, Pub L No 73-415, 48 Stat 1064 (1934), codified as
amended at 28 USC § 2072, it should not promulgate implicit amendments in the form of judicial
opinions. To avoid this embarrassment, Twombly's successor, Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937
(2009), claims to rely on the text of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a "showing" that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 129 S Ct at 1949-50 (explaining that, while Rule 8 is a "notable and
generous departure" from code pleading, it still requires the plaintiff to state more than mere
legal conclusions). The claim would be that Twombly and Iqbal rejected prior Court precedents
on Rule 8-for example, Conley v Gibson, 355 US 41, 45-46 (1957) (holding that courts should
not dismiss complaints for failure to state a claim unless the plaintiff can prove that there exists
"no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief")-not as an implicit
amendment of Rule 8 but because these precedents had not faithfully interpreted the pleading
standard. Either way, the understanding of Rule 8 has changed.
22 Twombly, 550 US at 558-59 (expressing concern about the high cost of discovery in
antitrust cases, which could "push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases").
23 The reach of Twombly was broadly asserted in Iqbal:"Twombly expounded the pleading
standard for all civil actions and [] applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike." Iqbal, 129
S Ct at 1953 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, commentators believe that
the reach of these cases is not so broad, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 Wash U J L &
Pol 61, 81-82,98-99 (2007), and there is considerable discretion in the lower courts to narrow the
applicability of Twombly and Iqbal in practice to cases in which the rationale of early dismissal
does not obtain.
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fondness for notice pleading, the Court's new rules authorize lower
courts to do exactly what Easterbrook did, whether or not it was his
intention to do it.2
The boldness of Jones is made apparent by the fact that neither
side in these mutual fund compensation cases supports the result Eas-
terbrook reached.' This is highly unusual, and is especially odd consi-
dering that the opinion delivers what seems to be a generous gift to
the mutual fund industry-an end to burdensome litigation. There are
two reasons why no one defended Jones: agency costs between the
lawyers and their clients, and a preference by the industry for the bro-
ken, but relatively benign, judicial review process over an unknown,
but potentially scary, new law that might have come from Congress
had the Supreme Court upheld Jones. This suggests that the Supreme
Court did not hear the full story of this case and this class of disputes
from the litigants; this Essay hopes to fill that gap.
I. MUTUAL FUND FEE LITIGATION
In the cottage industry of mutual fund compensation cases, the
dispute in Jones is about as vanilla as can be. Plaintiffs complained
that the Oakmark Funds, which defendant Harris Associates started
and then was hired to advise, were paying Harris too much for this
work.2 The law on point is § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of
1940,' which makes fund advisers, like Harris, fiduciaries with respect
to compensation received,' and Gartenberg v Merrill Lynch Asset
Management, Inc," which established a multifactor test" for courts to
24 As such, the relevant Supreme Court precedents are not those about paying executives,
for example, Rogers v Hill, 289 US 582,591-92 (1933) (establishing the rule that minority stock-
holders can block bonus payments to executives when the level of compensation bears no rela-
tion to the value of the services provided), but rather the Court's recent civil procedure cases,
Twombly and Iqbal.
25 See Brief for Petitioners, Jones v Harris Associates, No 08-586, *34-48 (US filed June 10,
2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 1640018) (arguing that the Seventh Circuit, by ignoring
congressional intent and relevant common law principles, misinterpreted § 36(b)); Brief for
Respondent, Jones v Harris Associates, No 08-586, *26-32 (US filed Aug 27, 2009) (available on
Westlaw at 2009 WL 2777652) (arguing for the Second Circuit's interpretation of "fiduciary
duty" under § 36(b) and emphasizing the "extensive, varied, and context-sensitive" nature of
fiduciary duties).
26 See Jones, 527 F3d at 629-31.
27 Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub L No 76-768, 54 Stat 789, codified at 15 USC
§ 80a-1 et seq.
28 See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 20, Pub L No 91-547,84 Stat 1413,
1429, amending 15 USC § 80a-35(b) ("[T]he investment adviser of a registered investment com-
pany shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for
services ... paid by such registered investment company ... to such investment adviser.").
29 694 F2d 923 (2d Cir 1982).
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determine when pay was so great that it amounted to a breach of the
§ 36(b) duty." Judges are not routinely in the business of adjudicating
the fairness or efficiency of private compensation contracts, but the
pay of mutual fund advisers may be different.3
Legal disputes about adviser compensation arise because of the
unique governance structure of mutual funds. A sponsoring invest-
ment company creates each mutual fund as a separate legal entity.
Each fund is managed by a board of directors, which is appointed by
the sponsor of the fund. The fund, acting through the board, then
chooses an adviser who will raise money, make investments, and then
manage those investments. The board virtually always chooses the
sponsor as adviser, and, as a practical matter, never replaces the advis-
er. Funds that perform badly are closed; they do not get new manage-
ment. The potential governance problem here should be obvious-the
board is supposed to negotiate a compensation schedule with the ad-
viser, but the adviser is rarely, if ever, fired," and it is the adviser
(when acting as sponsor) that appointed the board in the first place.
The law does two things to try to solve this problem. The first is to
require that the board of directors be composed of a certain percent-
age of "independent" directors.4 They are designed to be, and think of
themselves as, watchdogs for the interests of investors." This is an at-
tempt to put meaning in the fact that funds are legal entities separate
from the advisers that create, and ultimately advise, them. Independ-
ent directors are thought to owe their allegiance to the fund, not to
the sponsor or its adviser, and could be sued by investors in the fund if
3o Question: Why do lawyers love multifactor tests? Answer: They generate uncertainty,
which generates disputes, which in turn generate fees.
31 According to the district court in Jones, these factors include:
the cost to the adviser to provide services to the fund; the nature and quality of the services
that are provided, including the fund's performance history; whether and to what extent the
adviser realizes economies of scale as the fund's assets increase; the volume of orders from
the fund's investors that need to be processed ... ; and the conduct of, expertise of, and level
of information possessed by the trustees charged with approving the fee at the outset.
Jones v Harris Associates, 2007 WL 627640, *7 (ND 111) (accepting and applying the Gartenberg test).
32 The analogy between the compensation of executives of business corporations and the
advisers of mutual funds is extremely weak. See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to
Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits; Disinterested Directors; and the Ide-
ology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 Wash U L Q 1017, 1031-32 (2005).
33 See Jones, 527 F3d at 634 ("Mutual funds rarely fire their investment advisers."); Lyman
Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director "Independence": Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg
at Twenty-five, 61 Vand L Rev 497,519 & n 134 (2008) (citing a study that found only a handful of
cases in which a primary mutual fund adviser was fired).
3 At the time of the Jones suit, the law required 40 percent of the board to not be "interested
persons" as defined by the Investment Company Act. See 15 USC §§ 80a-2(19), 80a-10, 80a-15(c).
35 Based on ten confidential telephone interviews conducted with board members of ten
different mutual fund companies during September and October 2009.
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they violate this duty." But practice may deviate from theory here.
Even perfectly independent board members may be less vigorous than
desired at negotiating against the people to whom they owe their jobs
and with whom they interact on a regular basis. In order to provide
extra incentives for arm's length bargaining, there is a second re-
quirement: § 36(b) requires that the investment adviser assume the
status of a fiduciary of the fund and its investors with respect to com-
37pensation received for its services.
Jones was not the first case brought under § 36(b) alleging a
breach of this duty. Since the fiduciary duty was mandated in 1970,
there have been more than one hundred cases in which investors have
sued investment advisers claiming a breach of the fiduciary duty with
respect to compensation.' Defendants have "won" every case, mean-
ing a court has never held that a mutual fund adviser violated its
§ 36(b) fiduciary duties. Jones was no exception. The district court
granted Harris's motion for summary judgment based on Gartenberg,
rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that Harris's practice of charging a
lower rate for institutional investors than for individual investors
proved that the latter fees were too high.4 The court concluded that
the fees charged were not so disproportionate to the value received
that they amounted to a breach of the fiduciary duty.41
Although Judge Easterbrook approved of the district court's re-
sult-that Harris's fees were not a breach of its fiduciary duty-he
disagreed with its' reliance on Gartenberg and the judicial inquiry
36 The Supreme Court has referred to independent directors as "watchdogs" charged with
the "primary responsibility for looking after the interests of the funds' shareholders." Burks v
Lasker, 441 US 471, 484-85 (1979). See also Johnson, 61 Vand L Rev at 502-05 (cited in note 33)
(explaining that the management structure of investment funds creates a conflict between inde-
pendent directors who, in their role as "watchdogs" of investor interests, owe a duty of loyalty to
investors, and the advisers and sponsors of the fund, who control the assets and appoint directors
to the board); Sarah E. Cogan, Philip L. Kirstein, and Audrey C. Talley, The Fund Board of Direc-
tors and the Fund's Relationship with the Adviser, 1744 PLI-Corp 195, 225-26 (2009) (explaining
that, in addition to the regulations of the Investor Company Act of 1940, "fund directors are
subject to traditional standards of director responsibility under common law and state statutes").
37 See 15 USC § 80a-35(b) ("[T]he investment adviser of a registered investment company
shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services.").
38 See Johnson, 61 Vand L Rev at 519-20, 537-42 (cited in note 33) (discussing and listing
the 150 reported cases that have cited to Gartenberg since 1982).
39 See James D. Cox and John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral
Perspective, 83 Wash U L 0 907, 923 (2005) (noting that plaintiffs have yet to win a case despite
the "procedural ease" of bringing an action under § 36(b)). See also John P Freeman and Stewart
L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J Corp L 609, 644
(2001) ("[N]o plaintiff has yet met the Gartenberg burden of proving that fees extracted from a
given fund are 'unreasonably unreasonable."').
4 Jones, 2007 WL 627640 at *7-9.
41 Id at *9.
2010] 1033
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(read: costs) it begets. 42 Judge Easterbrook intended Jones to do more
than simply declare a winner in the litigation between Jones and Har-
ris-he wanted to declare an end to § 36(b) litigation altogether, or, at
least, the kind brought by private plaintiffs up to that point. He
wanted to put district courts out of the business of weighing the Gar-
tenberg factors because that inquiry is very costly,3 the results of the
inquiry are predetermined," and the existence of the inquiry does
nothing to deter the kinds of abuse the statute was designed to pre-
vent.5 Easterbrook's opinion deploys a theoretical claim about mar-
kets and a plausible reading of the statute, but there is another unwrit-
ten factor driving his conclusion.
The theory is based on the fact that investing is voluntary and in
open-ended funds, like Harris's, investors can withdraw their money at
any time at market value. So long as some investment decisions by
some investors are somewhat rational (that is, made based on the val-
ue received)," advisers are prevented from charging excessively high
fees, even where governance constraints are imperfect. There are more
than eight thousand funds competing heavily to attract nearly $16 tril-
lion in investment dollars; Easterbrook doubts whether courts and
their costly process can add much to this market for setting fees. 47 This
is consistent with the longstanding practice of courts addressing issues
of executive compensation. In the absence of obvious conflicts of in-
terest or egregious failures of the pay-setting process, courts rarely, if
ever, substitute their judgments for those of the market.4 Everyone
42 See Jones, 527 F3d at 631-32 (criticizing Gartenberg for "rel[ying] too little on markets").
43 See Part II.B.
44 See note 39 and accompanying text.
45 See Part II.C. See also Jones, 527 F3d at 634 (arguing that judicial assessment of reason-
ableness misses the mark because the key question is not whether adviser fees are excessive "in
the abstract," but whether they are too high with respect to the results available from other
investment vehicles-a question that investors are better suited than judges to answer).
46 Metrics commonly deployed in analysis of the industry, such as net asset value (NAV) returns,
may be misleading since they do not capture all of the potential value that may be received by inves-
tors See John Morley and Quinn Curtis, Exit, Voice and Fee Liability in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale L J *3
(forthcoming 2010), online at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=1547162 (visited Mar 17, 2010) (observing that
NAV ignores expectation of future fees or portfolio changes, so funds with different expected future
returns could have the same NAV); D. Bruce Johnsen, Myths about Mutual Fund Fees: Economic
Insights on Jones v. Harris *60 (George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper No
09-49, Sept 2009), online at http://worksbepresacom/d-brucejohnsen/3 (visited Sept 3,2010) (arguing
that mutual fund returns do not properly account for "the benefits from quality assurance in terms of
monitoring costs avoided" that investors in certain funds actually realize). For an overview of fund
performance analysis, see generally Ravi Shukla and Charles Trzcinka, Performance Measurement of
Managed Portfolios, 1 Fin Markets, Institutions & Instruments No 4 (1992).
47 See Jones, 527 F3d at 634.
48 See D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Com-
pensation, 81 'Ilane L Rev 829, 831-33 (2007) (describing the business judgment rule as ubiquit-
[77:10271034
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admits that the process for setting executive compensation is imper-
fect and results in some egregious compensation packages (when
judged ex post), but courts applying fiduciary duty analysis are quite
cautious about substituting their judgment for that of the (imperfect)
market.4 9 The market for mutual funds is mature and competitive, so it
strains credulity to claim that advisers can get away with charging su-
pracompetitive fees, let alone to contend that courts are equipped to
efficiently police abuses.
Critics say the market for adviser fees is imperfect, and some re-
cent empirical scholarship suggests there may be some investors who
pay too much for what they are getting." While these studies are inter-
esting and bring important attention to the question of securities mar-
kets participation by unsophisticated investors, this result should hard-
ly be surprising. In every market, whether it is for cars, legal services,
or haircuts, some people pay more than they should for what they are
getting. Smart businesses look for less-price-sensitive customers, and,
where they can, charge them more than they charge more sophisti-
cated shoppers. Other than a few statutory exceptions not applicable
to mutual funds," courts are not involved in remedying price discrimi-
nation. This is because the relevant question is not whether the market
works perfectly, but whether a judicial inquiry will make it better than
it would be without such an inquiry. It may be, for instance, that those
who are paying more are getting more, but what they are getting may
be invisible to the judicial eye. Unsophisticated investors may pay
more for their investments because they do not have the time or skills
to monitor the investments as well as sophisticated investors. These
extra fees might be a sort of quality assurance mechanism that com-
pensates managers who credibly commit not to cheat the investors
who cannot monitor as well as more sophisticated investors.
A response to this line of argument is to point to § 36(b) as evidence
that Congress wanted courts involved-a variant of the classic go-talk-to-
ous in corporate law jurisprudence and arguing that courts should conceptualize the rule as an
abstention doctrine rather than as an evidentiary guideline or a standard of review).
49 See, for example, In re Walt Disney Co Derivative Litigation, 906 A2d 27, 55-60, 70-73
(Del 2006) (refusing to review the pay of Disney executives).
50 See, for example, Javier Gil-Bazo and Pablo Ruiz-Verdd, The Relation between Price and
Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J Fin 2153, 2158-65 (2009) (demonstrating a negative
relationship between mutual fund fees and the before-fee risk-adjusted performance of the funds).
51 See, for example, Act of June 19, 1936 ("Robinson-Patman Act"), Pub L No 74-692,49
Stat 1526, codified at 15 USC § 13 (making it unlawful to "discriminate in price between differ-
ent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality" when the effect of such discrimination
is to harm competition); Act of August 15, 1921 ("Packers and Stockyards Act") § 202(b), Pub L
No 67-51, 42 Stat 159, 161, codified as amended at 7 USC § 192(b) (making it unlawful for any
meatpacker to give unreasonable preference or advantage-or unreasonable prejudice or disad-
vantage-to any person or locality in any manner whatsoever).
2010]1 1035
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the-legislature defense of objectionable statutes. Easterbrook, however,
sees the statutory command to be a fiduciary not as empowering courts
to be rate regulators, but rather to impose obligations of trust on the ad-
visers." Drawing on the law of trusts, from which fiduciary duties arise,
Easterbrook notes that being a fiduciary means nothing more than being
honest and forthcoming; it does not mean agreeing to a cap on the
amount that can be charged." After all, lawyers, brokers, trustees, and
CEOs are all fiduciaries, and there are no limits on what they can charge,
assuming they are truthful and play no games.
Delaware's treatment of corporate manager pay is instructive.
CEOs are fiduciaries of their shareholders, and yet courts do not in-
quire into whether their pay is "excessive" absent a gross conflict of
interest (for example, self-dealing) or an abysmal failure of process."
Cases alleging too much pay in Delaware must allege a breach of the
duty of care (insufficient process), a breach of the duty of loyalty (a
conflicted board), or that the pay was so extreme as to suggest a fail-
ure of process or a hidden conflict.-' In addition, the demand require-
ment in derivative litigation means plaintiffs must generally overcome
procedural hurdles, such as showing that the board is conflicted or
52 See Jones, 527 F3d at 632.
53 Id.
5 For some, Easterbrook's reading of the statutory term "fiduciary" as requiring more
than a claim of high fees will be enough to justify the result he reaches. Twombly and Iqbal
have nothing to say about the antecedent legal question of whether the statute forbids unrea-
sonable fees in the first place. That question presents a pure matter of statutory interpretation. In
performing that interpretation, Easterbrook's approach is in keeping with his familiar, rule-
based proclivities. For those who see "fiduciary," especially in this context, as being about some-
thing more, Twombly and lqbal come into play as to the question of whether plaintiffs have
mustered enough factual content to allow for a plausible finding that the fee was unreasonably
high. Or, more specifically, whether any plaintiffs will be able to do so in a way that justifies the
various costs of the judicial inquiry.
55 See Brehm v Eisner, 746 A2d 244, 263 (Del 2000) (stating that executive compensation
decisions are "entitled to great deference" and will be upset only if an agreement amounts to "an
exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could con-
clude that the corporation has received adequate consideration") (citation omitted). See also In
re Citigroup Inc Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A2d 106,136 (Del Ch 2009).
56 See Brehm, 746 A2d at 256, 262-64. Plaintiffs seldom overcome these stringent pleading
requirements in executive compensation cases, see Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin,
Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 Wash U L 0 569, 578 (2001)
(explaining that few plaintiffs are able to show that the defendants "committed waste, that is,
failed [their] substantive due care obligations by making an irrational decision"), but in a recent
Delaware Chancery decision, the shareholders managed to defeat a motion to dismiss on a claim
for waste, see Citigroup, 964 A2d at 138 (concluding that the plaintiffs stated a cognizable claim
for corporate waste in their allegations stemming from the CEO's agreement paying him $68
million in cash and stock despite his alleged responsibility for billions of dollars of losses at
Citigroup).'lIough it is not yet clear whether Citigroup represents a change in the courts' wil-
lingness to review executive pay, I believe the case falls into the "so extreme" category and does
not represent an inflection point in the law.
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self-dealing, before a case can proceed to discovery." Courts in Dela-
ware simply throw out cases that baldly assert too much pay, thereby
imposing no significant costs on defendants.
Easterbrook's interpretation of the statute also seems reasonable
in light of the likely congressional purpose in choosing an ambiguous
and flexible statutory term, like "fiduciary," instead of a more rigid
command. Easterbrook interprets § 36(b) as delegating to courts the
authority to determine the nature of the "fiduciary duty" inquiry
based on market and other factors.58 Instead of saying that pay must be
"reasonable" or is capped at a certain level or subject to a certain type
of review, the statute punted this question to judges in the future. It
might be that in a market in which there is very little competition (say,
because there are few funds or limited flows in and out of funds) de-
termining whether there has been a breach of fiduciary duty might
justify a robust judicial inquiry, while in a market with robust competi-
tion it would justify a hands-off approach. This choice fairly represents
the natural evolution of the mutual fund market since § 36(b) was
passed, and it would take a heroic interpretation of the language of
the statute to suggest that Congress meant to make a particular
process unalterable by changes in the market.
Although not explicit in Jones, the efficiency of § 36(b) litigation
was the ultimate question before the Supreme Court. Rule-loving
Easterbrook does not analyze the costs and benefits of this type of
litigation, but by making the cases much less profitable for plaintiffs'
lawyers, it is reasonable to assume that he believes the costs dwarf any
benefits. There is enough wiggle room in "fiduciary duty" to allow him
to construe it broadly if he thinks the benefits exceed the costs, or nar-
rowly if he thinks the opposite.
II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEE LITIGATION
Why would a judge reject a legal rule that had always resulted in
victory for defendants? The result for Harris would have been the
same (but cheaper") had Easterbrook followed Gartenberg: the Su-
preme Court would not have granted certiorari, and the issue of ad-
s7 See Stone v Ritter, 911 A2d 362,366-67 (Del 2006):
[T]he right of a stockholder to prosecute a derivative suit is limited to situations where ei-
ther the stockholder has demanded the directors pursue a corporate claim and the directors
have wrongfully refused to do so, or where demand is excused because the [plaintiffs have
shown that the] directors are incapable of making an impartial decision regarding whether
to institute such litigation.
ss Jones, 527 F3d at 632-34.
59 Harris had to pay to defend its district court victory at the Supreme Court, which must
have been an expensive undertaking.
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viser pay would not have potentially been a political issue. So why did
Easterbrook create a controversy, risk reversal, and impose substantial
costs on Harris by writing the opinion he did?
A. The Futility of Litigation
The answer has to do with civil procedure and the ineffectiveness
of federal courts at efficiently processing litigation. If litigation were
not costly, Easterbrook would have presumably found the Gartenberg
standard less objectionable. Although defendants can be confident ex
ante about prevailing against § 36(b) claims, this litigation is costly, and
these costs attract plaintiffs (or, rather, their lawyers) who can promise
to settle the case for less than these costs and allow the defendants to
avoid the time, hassle, and reputation costs of litigation. Advisers likely
fear the publicity and process of litigation (especially being deposed)
more than anything, and therefore may be eager to settle, especially
since they may be able to pass on some of the costs to investors."
In this case, the district court decided for Harris only after sum-
mary judgment, at which point Harris had likely spent millions of dol-
lars on discovery and lawyers. To bless the district court's decision at
this point would suggest that what the court did was correct, not only
on the merits, but also in terms of the analysis and the timing of its
decision. If decisions about pay are to be made at summary judgment
(or after), this sets the value of any settlement much higher than if the
same decisions can be made earlier in the litigation, especially before
discovery. A simple affirmance of the district court might have been
the victory Harris wanted, but it would have been a defeat for other
funds and for investors, since it would have left open the possibility of
future suits of this kind and encouraged those suits to go to the later
stages of litigation necessary for courts to get the facts needed to ap-
ply the Gartenberg factors.
The suit in Jones was about rent extraction of these expected liti-
gation costs from defendants. The probability of victory at trial for the
plaintiffs was zero when they filed the case. No set of facts has ever
resulted in liability against mutual fund investment advisers, and, as
6 Easterbrook might still believe that judicial resources could be better spent elsewhere.
61 Defendants undoubtedly write the check for any settlement, but it is likely that fees
generally increase to account for expected settlements. If litigation costs are somewhat random,
the payment by a fund of a settlement should have no impact on the fund's ability to attract
capital, especially since settlements are trivial in comparison to fund size and are confidential in
any event. While defendants pay, investors ultimately bear the costs.
62 See Part II.B. Consider In re Cox Communications Inc Shareholders Litigation, 879 A2d
604, 64042 (Del Ch 2005) (denying a request for $4.95 million in legal fees by the plaintiffs'
attorneys and awarding $1.275 million following the settlement of a suit challenging whether
directors had fulfilled their fiduciary obligations with respect to a merger agreement).
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the district court opinion makes clear, the facts in Jones were unre-
markable. Fees paid to Harris were standard in the industry, and there
was no evidence of significant conflicts of interest, lack of disclosure,
or other tricks that would generate judicial concern. Importantly, the
plaintiffs' best argument-that Harris was paid more to manage the
accounts of individual investors than it was to manage the accounts of
institutional investors-had been rejected by many other courts.
Putting aside the merits of this argument, the implausibility of this
district court reaching a different conclusion than the numerous other
courts that had considered precisely the same argument in the exact
same context and rejected it absolutely as a legal matter means the
case was a sure loser. And yet, there it was, imposing costs on Harris,
using judicial resources, and diverting plaintiffs and their lawyers from
more meaningful pursuits.
The problem of strike suits and the incentives created by ineffi-
cient litigation is more acute in federal than in state courts on these
issues,4 and hence may justify the kind of procedural intervention in
Jones. In federal courts, where litigating the reasonableness of pay is
costly, plaintiffs can extract larger settlements than they can in state
courts, like Delaware, where the costs are nearly zero. As a result, we
see a similar legal standard -a fiduciary duty with a limit on excessive
63 Jones v Harris Associates, 2007 WL 627640, *8 (ND Ill).
6 See, for example, In re Evergreen Mutual Funds Fee Litigation, 240 FRD 115, 122
(SDNY 2007) ("[S]uch comparisons are not necessarily informative when assessing whether fees
are disproportionate to the services rendered."). See also Strougo v BEA Associates, 188 F Supp
2d 373, 384 (SDNY 2002) (dismissing a § 36(b) action despite evidence that the investment ad-
viser received less in fees from its institutional clients, because the "relevant comparison must be
to other mutual funds, not to non-mutual fund institutional clients"); Schuyt v Rowe Price Prime
Reserve Fund, Inc, 663 F Supp 962, 973 n 38 (SDNY 1987) (rejecting the plaintiffs' expert analy-
sis, which compared the fees that the adviser charged the fund with fees the adviser charged
other, non-mutual fund entities), affd, 835 F2d 45 (2d Cir 1987). But see Gallus v Ameriprise
Financial, Inc, 561 F3d 816, 823-24 (8th Cir 2009) (finding error in the district court's refusal to
compare the fees charged to institutional clients with those charged to mutual fund clients).
65 See text accompanying notes 99-101.
6 Id. Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have no analogue to Delaware's demand
requirement, the federal system lacks an effective mechanism for screening out frivolous share-
holder suits prior to discovery. Consider Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723,
741-43 (1975) (explaining that in securities cases, even unfounded claims "ha[ve] settlement
value to the plaintiff ... because of the threat of extensive discovery and disruption of normal
business activities which may accompany a lawsuit which is groundless in any event, but cannot
be proved so before trial"); Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Pri-
vate Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 Vand L Rev 1747, 1749, 1759-60 (2004) (noting that only
about thirty shareholder derivative actions are brought in Delaware each year and attributing
the low rate in part to Delaware's demand requirement, which essentially requires plaintiffs to
allege demand futility while simultaneously preventing them from using discovery to obtain
information that would support their allegation).
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compensation"-generating hundreds and hundreds of federal cases
and few if any state law cases.6 This despite the fact that, as Judge Ri-
chard Posner hints in his dissent from the Seventh Circuit's denial of
rehearing en banc in Jones, there is as much or more evidence of fail-
ures in the executive compensation market as there is in the adviser
compensation market." From the fact that a similar legal standard
generates many more cases in federal court than state court, we might
conclude that there are different costs and benefits of compensation
litigation across these jurisdictions. One might conclude that the
§ 36(b) duty as interpreted by courts to this point generates large costs
without attendant benefits in part because of the inadequacy of feder-
al courts in efficiently processing claims. To show this, however, re-
quires an analysis of the costs and benefits of § 36(b) cases.
B. Costs
There are several costs of § 36(b) litigation that are readily ap-
parent. Most obviously, there are the actual legal costs of prosecuting
and defending these suits. Other costs include: the distraction that liti-
gation causes for advisers and boards; the negative consequences of
67 In state courts, the standard is whether the pay was so excessive as to constitute a
"waste" of corporate assets, see In re Citigroup Inc Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A2d
106, 136 (Del Ch 2009) (clarifying that, to assert a waste claim successfully, a plaintiff "must
overcome the general presumption of good faith by showing that the board's decision was so
egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of the corpora-
tion's best interests") (citation omitted), while in federal courts it is whether the adviser pay is
"so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered,"
see Gartenberg, 694 F2d at 928. In both cases, the core underlying concern is whether the pay can
reasonably be said to be the result of arm's length bargaining.
68 The leading study on state law pay litigation finds just 124 cases from 1912 to 2000 in all
states. See Thomas and Martin, 79 Wash U L Q at 573-74 (cited in note 56) (gathering all cases
available from the Lexis and Westlaw databases dealing with the process, size, or composition of
executive compensation). The study finds that there are very few cases in this nearly ninety-year
period in which there were bald allegations of too much pay without corresponding claims of
process failures or conflicts of interest. Id at 578-79. In addition, it finds that claims are much
more likely to be brought and to succeed against private firms, where the risk of expropriation
from minority shareholders is much higher than for public firms. Id at 586-87. (Mutual funds are
much more akin to publicly traded companies, since in a mutual fund there are no minority
shareholders whose interests are frozen in the corporate form, as they may be in a privately held
corporation.) These data fit with the perspective of experts in Delaware litigation that there are
no cases filed in Delaware courts today in which plaintiffs allege simply that executives are paid
too much without allegations of procedural irregularities or loyalty problems. Telephone inter-
view with Charles Elson, Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance,
University of Delaware (Sept 3,2009).
6 Jones v Harris Associates, 537 F3d 728, 730-31 (7th Cir 2008) (Posner dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (citing a growing consensus that executive compensation in large
public firms "often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards ... to police compensa-
tion," and arguing both that mutual funds suffer from similar problems and that market competi-
tion cannot be relied upon to solve these problems in either case).
HeinOnline  -- 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1040 2010
Justifying Jones
making boards focus on regulatory matters and compliance when they
could focus on business or strategy matters; and the potential false
sense of security that the law gives investors.
We can get a rough idea of the (lower bound) cost of § 36(b) litiga-
tion by looking at the legal work involved in these cases. Although data
is unavailable as to the specific costs, one need only look at Jones to see
that the amounts are significant. Seventeen attorneys were involved in
Jones at the district court, and they filed more than twenty motions or
memoranda. So far the case has generated six court opinions.'o The costs
for Harris to defend the suit to this point are in the tens of millions of
dollars, according to a lawyer familiar with the litigation."
A look at the publicly available records of the legal work from a
selection of 20 of the more than 150 reported cases involving § 36(b)
claims under the Gartenberg standard provides a sense of the costs of
this kind of litigation more generally.7 2 The average case was on the
judicial docket for more than two years, involved about a dozen law-
yers, and generated more than ten orders from the courts. If we extra-
polate the average of these cases to 150 cases (a rough estimate of the
number of published § 36(b) opinions), we can get a sense of what was
at stake for the entire mutual fund industry (as opposed to Harris) in
Jones. Extrapolating from the sample of twenty cases, we can estimate
that these cases involved approximately 1,400 lawyers filing nearly
1,000 motions and about 1,500 legal briefs, and generated more than
1,400 judicial orders. There are no data available on how much any of
this costs, but it is undoubtedly significant, especially because the
number of published cases must be dwarfed by the number of cases
that are filed but settled before they generated written opinions."
We can get a ballpark estimate of the total costs of § 36(b) litiga-
tion by making some reasonable assumptions based on information
from industry experts and insiders. We know from Professor Lyman
Johnson that there have been about 150 cases citing Gartenberg that
70 These figures are based on the author's analysis of court records. The six opinions are
Jones v Harris Associates, 130 S Ct 1418 (2010), Jones v Harris Associates, 537 F3d 728 (7th Cir
2008); Jones v Harris Associates, 527 F3d 627 (7th Cir 2008); Jones v Harris Associates, 2007 WL
627640 (ND Ill); Jones v Harris Associates, 2006 WL 1005100 (ND Ill); Jones v Harris Associates,
2005 WL 831301 (ND Ill).
71 Confidential telephone interview with a lawyer familiar with the litigation (Sept 29,2009).
72 The ensuing figures were calculated by examining the courts' records corresponding to
the 150 reported § 36(b) cases identified by Professor Lyman Johnson. See Johnson, 61 Vand L
Rev at 499-500 (cited in note 33). The 20 cases for which sufficient data were available were
examined, and their results averaged. These averages were then multiplied by 150 to obtain the
aggregate figures.
73 See Thomas and Martin, 79 Wash U L Q at 574 n 20 (cited in note 56) (estimating that be-
tween 2 and 10 percent of all executive compensation challenges filed ever yield a judicial opinion).
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have generated published opinions.4 Taking a subset of these cases,
Johnson finds about 60 percent of these were cases that were resolved
prior to summary judgment and 40 percent at summary judgment or
later." If for the sake of simplicity we assume about a fifty-fifty split
across all cases, we can get a very rough, ballpark estimate the costs of
the litigation. One estimate from an industry insider is that taking a
§ 36(b) case to summary judgment costs defendants about $20 mil-
lion." If we assume that the cases resolved at the motion to dismiss
stage are much cheaper, say $1 million, then we can get an estimate of
the defendants' costs in these 150 cases over the past 27 years-about
$1.6 billion."
In addition, a number of other cases settled before they could
generate a written legal opinion.' One estimate from an industry ex-
pert is that each fund, of which there are about eight thousand today,"
has about a 1 percent chance of being sued every year." This generates
about 80 cases per year, for a total of 2,160 cases since 1982. Since the
number of funds has changed over time, however, this figure may
overstate the total number of cases. To be conservative, we can esti-
mate that about half that number, or about one thousand cases, have
been settled since 1982. The cost of the average settlement must be
less than the cost of going to summary judgment, so we can ballpark
this at about half the cost of summary judgment, or about $10 million
for each settlement. A representative of the industry confirms that this
is a reasonable estimate," although no publicly available information
exists. This means there is an additional cost of $10 billion over the
74 See Johnson, 61 Vand L Rev at 499-500 (cited in note 33).
75 See id at 519-20.
76 Confidential telephone interview with a representative from a mutual fund industry
trade group (Oct 9,2009).
7 This is calculated as: 75 cases x $20 million plus 75 cases x $1 million.
78 For some recent settlements, see Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Vaughn v Putnam In-
vestment Management, LLC, Civil Action No 04-10988 (D Mass Mar 31,2008); Stipulation of Dismis-
sal with Prejudice, Dumond v Massachusetts Financial Services Co, Civil Action No 04-11458 (D Mass
Nov 20,2007); Stipulation of Dismissal, Strigliabotti v Franklin Resources Inc, No C-04-0883 (ND Cal
Aug 9,2007); Notice of Dismissal, Sins v Janus Capital Management LLC, No 04-cv-01647 (D Colo
May 2, 2007); Memorandum and Order, Hunt v Invesco Funds Group, Inc, No 04-cv-2555 (SD Tex
Jan 29,2007); Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Williams v Waddell & Reed Investment Manage-
ment Co, No 04-2561 (D Kan Sept 25,2006). See also James N. Benedict, et al, Recent Developments in
Litigation Involving Mutual Funds and InvestmentAdvisers, 1732 PLI-Corp 943,951 (2009).
79 See Jones, 527 F3d at 633-34 ("By the end of 2002, over 8,000 mutual funds held more
than $6 trillion in assets.").
8 Confidential telephone interview with a representative from a mutual fund industry
trade group (Oct 1, 2009).
81 Id.
1042 [77:1027
HeinOnline  -- 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1042 2010
2010] Justifying Jones 1043
past 27 years." The total cost for defendants to defend or settle these
suits is therefore about $11 billion.83 This amounts to roughly
$400 million in costs per year for the industry as a whole.
This is a large amount in the aggregate, but amounts to only
about $50,000 per fund per year. As discussed further below,8 if the
average fund has assets of $1.4 billion and a management fee of about
1 percent," this means that the management fees are about $14 million
per year. Expected litigation costs of $50,000 per year thus amount to
a litigation tax of just 0.4 percent of revenue. This is therefore a case in
which there are potentially large aggregate costs (about $400 million
per year) but very small private costs for each actor: hence the seed
for justifying Judge Easterbrook considering the aggregate costs of
§ 36(b) litigation instead of just the interests of the parties.
82 If the percentage estimate applies to fund families, instead of funds, the total number of
cases per year looks more like 5, since there are about 500 fund families. In that case, the total
costs for these cases is about $1.4 billion (5 x $10 million x 27), giving a total cost of about
$3 billion since 1982 if we include the settled cases, see note 77 and accompanying text, or about
$200,000 per fund family per year.
83 Plaintiffs have costs too, but these are likely trivial in comparison, since they involve
only lawyers' fees, and do not include discovery costs, which are likely the biggest costs. See Tom
Baker and Sean J. Griffith, How Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers' Insurance and Securities
Settlements, 157 U Pa L Rev 755,777 (2009) (noting that a document-discovery database can cost
millions of dollars for some large cases, and that such costs "create an obvious and well-known
incentive for defendants to settle"). See also John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's
Fatal Flaws, 84 Minn L Rev 505, 543 (2000) (noting that discovery places a disproportionate
burden on defendants because the plaintiff receives "not only all of the informational benefits
from discovery, but also impositional benefits in the form of expenses imposed on the respond-
er"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 BU L Rev 635, 643 (1989) (pointing out that
discovery imposes "asymmetric costs"). If it costs plaintiffs $1 million in legal fees to take a case
to summary judgment, and just $100,000 otherwise, the total costs for these cases are only about
$300 million over the twenty-seven-year period. We can therefore safely ignore them, since they
are within a reasonable margin of error for these assumptions.
8 See notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
85 There are about $11 trillion in assets under management, see Investment Company
Institute, Trends in Mutual Fund Investing: April 2010, online at http://www.ici.org/research/
stats/trends/trends_- 04_10 (visited June 27,2010), at about 8,000 funds, meaning the average fund
has about $1.4 billion in assets under management. One percent is the approximate management
fee charged by defendant Harris Associates for the Oakmark Funds, which the parties and the
court characterized as about average. See Jones, 2007 WL 627640 at *1 (describing Oakmark's
fee schedule, which required payment of a I percent fee on the first $2 billion of the fund's as-
sets); id at *8 (observing that neither party disputes the fact that Oakmark's adviser fees were
comparable to those of similar funds managed by other companies). See also SEC, Division of
Investment Management, Report on Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses III.B.1, III.C.2 (Dec 2000),
online at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm (visited Feb 28, 2010) (calculating an
average expense ratio, which includes administrative in addition to adviser fees, of between 0.94
and 1.36 percent across all mutual funds in 1999).
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C. Benefits
Litigation has not only costs but also benefits, and we should en-
courage laws that generate disputes in which the latter generally out-
weigh the former. The only possible benefit of § 36(b) would be that
funds are deterred from overcharging their investors because of the
risk of litigation. In order to support Gartenberg, one would have to
believe that without the right to sue under this standard, investment
advisers would pay themselves more than they currently do, and that
this amount exceeds the costs of the litigation. It is possible that an
articulate and administrable rule punishing advisers ex post for
wrongdoing could efficiently reduce the monitoring costs of unsophis-
ticated investors, but there is no reason based on the experience to
date to think that Gartenberg gets this right. By contrast, Easter-
brook's rule seems to provide for punishment based on the worst type
of abuses while minimizing the possibility that false positives" will
impose large costs on investors.
The Gartenberg standard might have some deterrent effect if ad-
visers believe suits under § 36(b) occur when funds charge fees that
are relatively high or are otherwise unjustified by the performance of
the fund. If advisers believe that charging higher fees will incur suits,
this may deter them somewhat from charging those fees." But if advis-
ers believe that the chance of suit is independent of the fees they
charge, then it will not deter overcharging as effectively, if at all. An
unscientific but random sample of board members and industry insid-
ers interviewed for this Essay suggests that board members believe
suits under § 36(b) are not correlated with the rate of fees charged,
the board process for setting those fees, nor whether the fees are "de-
served" in some sense. Board members describe the chances of the
adviser being sued in a § 36(b) case as "unrelated to the amount of
fees paid," "the same no matter how much we negotiate or how much
due diligence we do," "as random as being struck by lightning," and
"related more to the size of the fund and whether a plaintiff can be
found than anything to do with fees."" Whether or not these assertions
are true, boards seem to think they are true, which undermines any
deterrent effect that the law as implemented may provide.
86 See Part III.
8 Bruce Johnsen claims that this entire inquiry is irrelevant, because if a fund lowers its
fees, while holding performance constant, it should see a corresponding increase in the assets of
the fund that perfectly offsets the drop in fees. See Johnsen, Myths about Mutual Fund Fees at
*45 (cited in note 46).
88 Based on ten confidential telephone interviews conducted with board members of ten
different mutual fund companies conducted during September and October 2009.
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As mentioned above, there is some evidence that some (small)
funds charge higher fees than their performance seems to warrant,"
but according to industry observers and lawyers involved in these cas-
es (on both sides), these are not the firms that get sued.0 Plaintiffs'
lawyers recognize that the Gartenberg standard is nearly impossible to
meet, so the chance of being the first case to prevail at trial is very low.
If this is true and the object of the suit is settlement, it makes much
more sense to go after deep-pocketed defendants. This is especially
true given that the amount of damages is capped at the amount of
"excessive" fees paid in the prior year.9 Since fees are based on a per-
centage of total assets, and it presumably costs the same to go after
the adviser of a big fund as a small one, it makes sense, all else being
equal, to target the big ones. One might argue that big funds will be
more ably represented, but because settlements can be won with little
or no consideration of the merits, the fact that the case against large
funds might not be as good as that against smaller funds is irrelevant.
Insofar as the merits are meaningless, the quality of lawyering should
not be a major factor in the decision of whom to sue, especially since
good lawyers presumably cost more than bad ones, which just raises
the value of any settlement.
Not only are § 36(b) cases believed to be uncorrelated with the
relative size of fees, but as a practical matter, the amount of deter-
rence from these cases is likely to be trivial given the relatively low
stakes of the litigation compared to the size of the industry and the
compensation of investment advisers. To see this, consider the Oak-
mark Funds managed by Harris. The funds had about $5 billion in as-
sets and management fees of about 1 percent of this amount, or
$50 million per year.9' If plaintiffs were successful in their litigation,
and were able to reduce Harris's fees to, say, 0.7 percent, the damages
would be about $15 million. This means that for Harris to be deterred
from charging "too much" (1 percent versus 0.7 percent), it must face
an expected cost from litigation of more than $15 million per year.
89 See note 50 and accompanying text.
9o Based on in-person interviews with lawyers and industry experts.
91 See note 94.
9 See Jones, 2007 WL 627640 at *1. These figures have been rounded in order to simplify
the calculations. Based on the fee schedule described by the district court, see Jones, 2007 WL
627640 at *1, the management fee was 0.88 percent.
93 That is, 1 percent minus 0.7 percent x $5 billion = $15 million.
94 Importantly, § 36(b) limits the amount of damages to the one-year period prior to filing
suit. See § 36(b)(3) ("No award of damages shall be recoverable for any period prior to one year
before the action was instituted."). Note that if litigation costs are expected to be less than
$15 million, Harris would pocket the "extra" $15 million, pay the costs of litigation, and keep the
(positive) difference.
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But expected litigation costs are likely much less than $15 million
per year. The best available information suggests firms have about a
1 percent chance of suit in a given year," meaning a suit would have to
cost (either in damages, settlement costs, or litigation costs) more than
$1.5 billion in order for the fund to be deterred from charging "exces-
sive" fees. But the statute limits damages to the excessive fees charged
in the year prior to the suit, and, as such, this is impossible. Or, looking
at it another way, if litigation fees are $20 million to get to summary
judgment, and the probability of being sued in any year is 1 percent,
then the value of the deterrence is $200,000 per year. If the fund has
$5 billion in assets under management, this would amount to a differ-
ence in fees of 0.004 percentage points (for example, 0.996 percent
instead of 1 percent in fees). A final way of seeing this is to point out
that if it costs $15 million to settle a suit and the gains from excessive
payments are about $15 million per year, then to be deterred from
overpaying, funds would have to face a 100 percent probability of suit
every year.
This crude model shows that deterrence is a very weak basis for
justifying the Gartenberg rule. To be sure, this analysis assumes a ra-
ther crude model in which the board and the adviser are functioning
purely as a collective version of Homo economicus. The model does
not describe the reality of actual board-adviser negotiations; rather it
merely points out the incentives under which advisers and board
members operate, whether they are cognizant of them or not.
Nevertheless, one could argue that § 36(b) has a deterrent effect
because the independent directors of funds disregard the simple eco-
nomics of the litigation threat, and instead want to do the right thing
and take their fiduciary duties seriously. Without impugning board
members or advisers, this description does not square with the view
expressed by board members that suits are not correlated with the
seriousness with which they take their jobs.5 It also is inconsistent with
a regime in which most cases settle privately-if advisers can avoid
nonmonetary costs, such as negative publicity, being deposed, and so
on, by paying to make suits go away, then any deterrence must be
viewed in monetary terms.
There are two external constraints on the fees boards authorize
and advisers accept-market forces in the form of attracting assets
and the threat of litigation. If the latter is purely random, and the for-
mer is highly (but not perfectly) correlated with the payment of rea-
95 See note 80 and accompanying text.
9 See note 88 and accompanying text.
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sonable fees," then the market forces constraint will dominate. If we
relied solely on the litigation deterrent, the analysis returns to the fi-
nancial incentives discussed above, and these would be plainly insuffi-
cient to reduce pay. When Easterbrook writes that the problem with
Gartenberg is that it relies too little on market forces," this is what he
has in mind.
There may be some value in best-practices standards, like those
found in Gartenberg or in a random (or, better yet, targeted) audit of
funds. Under this theory, the Gartenberg test is important because it
makes board members and advisers do work they would otherwise
not do, and, even if suits are random, improves the terms of any set-
tlement or the likelihood of prevailing at trial. Even if plausible, there
is no reason to think that the current system of private enforcement of
§ 36(b) is the most efficient way of achieving this goal. The SEC and a
variety of quasi-governmental agencies, such as those regulating bro-
kers and other securities professionals, have several advantages over
courts in deploying this type of soft regulation. First, as experts in this
area, these agencies are likely better positioned to make judgments
about the reasonableness of fees based on the latest empirical data
and the state of the market as a whole. Second, government agencies
presumably have less incentive to engage in strike suits, since the law-
yers bringing the cases are not compensated in direct proportion to
the size of any settlements. In other words, all else being equal, gov-
ernment prosecutors have stronger incentives to represent the plain-
tiffs who are most likely harmed by the current compensation scheme
for fund advisers-that is, less sophisticated and less-price-sensitive
investors in smaller funds.
The comparative advantage of the government as prosecutor
here points to an answer to another puzzle about the case: why did the
Supreme Court reinstate a standard that never results in victory for
plaintiffs, is used by plaintiffs' lawyers to extract settlements from
large and relatively well-paying funds, and is providing little or no de-
97 See Johnsen, Myths about Mutual Fund Fees at *45 (cited in note 46) ("Holding inves-
tors' expectations of manager stock picking skill and other factors constant between two funds,
the fund with the lower fee will simply attract larger inflows in the process of equalizing inves-
tors' returns with their best outside opportunity."); John C. Coates, IV and R. Glenn Hubbard,
Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J Corp L 151,
180,183-84 (2007) (concluding on the basis of empirical evidence that "investors shift substantial
amounts of assets out of high-fee funds and into low-fee funds," bolstering the claim that fund
competition "strongly constrains advisory fees"). See also Morley and Curtis, 120 Yale L J at *24
(cited in note 46) (arguing that mutual fund investors who are unhappy with a fund's performance
will almost always redeem their shares and reinvest with a fund offering competitive fees and re-
turns rather than exercise their shareholder rights or sue the fund).
98 Jones, 527 F3d at 632.
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terrent effects? One answer might be that the Gartenberg standard
preserves the possibility that the government might someday bring a
§ 36(b) case. But the billions spent on (or, wasted on) private litigation
to date seems like a fairly stiff price to pay for the remote future pos-
sibility of government action. In addition, the SEC could, through
rulemaking, enforcement of existing rules on brokers, education of
investors, jawboning, or other means, try to influence the behavior of
fund advisers or investors in funds allegedly charging excessive fees.
Nothing in Jones ties the hands of the government in solving this prob-
lem, if it exists. And, in fact, the expert agencies are the ones likely
better positioned to make both the judgment about whether there is a
problem and, if there is, its most efficient solution.
III. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Given the high costs and phantom benefits of § 36(b) litigation,
efficiency is a compelling justification for Easterbrook's opinion in
Jones. Bringing federal pay litigation in line with Delaware pay litiga-
tion would likely have resulted in lower litigation costs while preserv-
ing the ability to punish the worst abuses. A potential problem with all
this for the rule-bound Judge Easterbrook is that, on their face, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not obviously permit federal
courts to weed out cases in the way that the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery can. Delaware courts employ the demand requirement to give
their expert judges a peek at the merits before discovery," and the
Court of Chancery is known for dismissing cases quickly and at early
stages of the litigation, as soon as it believes the merits can be eval-
uated. In federal courts, at least before Ashcroft v Iqbal,' the notice-
pleading standard of the current Rules allowed plaintiffs to proceed to
discovery so long as they clearly stated a claim upon which relief
could be granted."o' In § 36(b) cases, this would seem to only require
plaintiffs to complain that adviser pay was so high that it breached the
statutory duty. Rule 8 does not seem to permit courts to dispense with
§ 36(b) cases at the motion to dismiss stage so long as the complaint is
well pleaded. For the rule-loving Easterbrook, any attempt to short-
circuit the merits at an earlier, arguably more efficient, time in the
litigation looks a bit like what he rejected in Vincent.
99 See Del Ch Ct R 23.1 ("The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or compa-
rable authority and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making
the effort."); Stone v Ritter, 911 A2d 362, 366-67 (Del 2006).
1oo 129 S Ct 1937 (2009).
101 See FRCP 8(a)(2).
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As discussed above, the discretion in the interpretation of "fidu-
ciary" is one way around this problem.m But there is a better way. Al-
though Easterbrook does not cite them, two recent Supreme Court
cases, Twombly and Iqbal, implicitly amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to bless the kind of end run that Easterbrook makes. These
cases instruct lower courts to dispose of cases quickly and with low
cost where discovery will not add value to the analysis a court will
make. The idea is to reduce strike-suit incentives in cases in which the
payoff from additional litigation expenses is less than or equal to zero.
Richard Epstein describes what the Supreme Court was doing in
Twombly as follows:
The truth of the matter, quite simply, is that the Supreme Court
looked over the allegations in the complaint, thought of all the
reasons why they did not make any sense in the context of this [ ]
industry, and then refused to allow discovery to go forward be-
cause it had no confidence that thousands of hours of work would
dredge up any new information that would alter its priors.10
A bare allegation of a price-fixing conspiracy, as was pleaded in
Twombly,m would normally be sufficient to get past a motion to dis-
miss based on allegations of parallel conduct. According to Epstein,
however, the Court concluded that the large discovery costs would not
add much to the analysis beyond what was already available from
public records, which are not costly to procure.os The general rule from
Twombly, and thus the new rule of civil procedure1 O is that where
there are two plausible theories of the case (one benign and one sinis-
ter), and the answer about which one is more likely can be determined
without taking the case further and imposing costs on the parties,
courts should opt for an earlier decision on the merits. Epstein sum-
marizes this reading of Twombly: "[D]iscovery is appropriate only
102 See text accompanying note 18.
103 See Epstein, 25 Wash U J L & Pol at 77 (cited in note 23).
104 550 US at 564-"6.
105 See Epstein, 25 Wash U J L & Pol at 76-77,82 (cited in note 23). See also Twombly, 550
US at 558, 566-69 (noting the expense of discovery and explaining why the existence of a con-
spiracy could not be reliably inferred from the facts presented by the plaintiffs).
106 The Supreme Court writes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it can amend them
formally, see 28 USC § 2072 ("The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure ... for cases in the United States district courts .. . and courts of
appeals."), or informally through its opinions, see Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Para-
digm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 NYU L Rev 1165, 1218
n 270 (1996) (noting that courts can often accomplish more through case law than formal rule-
making). Consider also note 21.
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when there is some evidence from some nonpublic source that justi-
fies the greater expense of the discovery on the case."'l
Caution about the scope of the judicial role is warranted because
there is an asymmetry between the two types of errors that courts can
make. False positives (Type I errors) attribute sinister behavior where
there is none, while false negatives (Type II errors) do not catch such
behavior where it does exist. While both types of errors may arise,
they should not have equal weight in assessing the costs of litigation
when there exist external factors that discipline firms. If a cartel (as
alleged in Twombly) or overpaying advisers (as alleged in Jones) is
difficult to maintain in the long run because of market pressures, then
false negatives will be rare because of this instability. False positives
may be more likely, however, because of the ex post bias of litigation
and the limited information and lack of expertise that courts have on
these issues. In addition, it is difficult to undo a judicial order commit-
ting a Type I error, while a Type II error is unlikely to persist for long.
Twombly hammers home this important gatekeeping function of
pleading rules by trying to limit the judicial role where Type I errors
likely swamp Type II errors.
Easterbrook's opinion in Jones follows directly. There are perfect-
ly sensible reasons why funds might charge lower fees for bigger cus-
tomers (Jones's best argument), and none of the facts about how much
Harris was charging to whom was hidden from the public at the early
stages of the litigation. In other words, the Gartenberg factors-for
example, questions about economies of scale-apply across the board
for all funds and are answerable at a general level. No one before
Jones disputed that funds charged these different fees, that fees are
fully disclosed, that there are different services provided to different
customers, and so on. It may be that, as a normative matter, funds
should charge unsophisticated investors less or sophisticated ones
more, but this is beside the point." Costly litigation is unlikely to aid
our understanding or analysis of the problem.
Like the Court's opinions in Twombly and Iqbal, Jones is about
reducing the social costs of meaningless litigation. Easterbrook be-
lieves § 36(b) cases are unjustified, absent self-dealing or a problem
with the pay-setting process, based on an analysis of the economics of
mutual fund compensation. While this argument has some appeal, it is
not even necessary. All the evidence one needs to conclude that the
107 Epstein, 25 Wash U J L & Pol at 81-42 (cited in note 23) (explaining that, because the
plaintiffs relied exclusively on public information in Twombly, the Supreme Court appropriately
treated the motion to dismiss as a "mini-summary judgment").
1os For an argument that unsophisticated investors benefit from higher fees, see Johnsen,
Myths about Mutual Fund Fees at *52-64 (cited in note 46).
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game is not worth the candle with these cases is the simple fact that
§ 36(b) plaintiffs have never won, and yet they have filed hundreds of
cases in an attempt to extract settlements from defendants.
CONCLUSION
Easterbrook's opinion in Jones is a remarkable opinion more be-
cause of what it does than what it says. The decision lays bare the cost-
ly but mutually beneficial game being played by both sides in mutual
fund fee litigation. Gartenberg imposes a random but very small tax
on mutual fund adviser compensation, which the industry can simply
pass on to its investors. For nearly three decades, courts have handled
hundreds of cases under this standard, and thereby allowed a multibil-
lion dollar wealth transfer from investors to lawyers. Lawyers on both
sides have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, but so does
the mutual fund industry.
Easterbrook's opinion was not one either party in Jones predicted
or wanted.9 The losers (the plaintiffs, their lawyers, and plaintiffs'
lawyers generally) were given a much worse defeat than if Judge Eas-
terbrook had just affirmed the district court's decision that the fees
charged were not disproportionately large under Gartenberg. Easter-
brook's opinion in Jones would have made future mutual fund com-
pensation cases much less likely by making a breach of the statutory
fiduciary duty much more difficult to prove. Plaintiffs would have had
to show a lack of disclosure or conflict of interest on the board
amounting to self-dealing; simply asserting excessive pay would not
have been sufficient as a matter of law. This means the business of
bringing and defending these suits would have been much less profita-
ble. The agency costs between investors and their lawyers and between
funds and their lawyers may explain some of this status quo bias.
But even the winners were losers. The opinion generated a grant
of certiorari, which imposed additional litigation costs on Harris.
Judge Easterbrook tried to do away with this class of claims generally,
and Harris was forced to pay the freight. But it is unlikely that the
intended beneficiaries-mutual funds in general-were happy with
the outcome in Jones either. The opinion raised the saliency of mutual
fund pay at a politically inopportune time, and might have generated a
10 Amazingly, no briefs at the Supreme Court defend the approach Judge Easterbrook took.
The amicus brief of the industry, submitted by the Investment Company Institute, asserts that Gar-
tenberg provides "real and substantial protection to investors." Brief for the Investment Company
Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones v Harris Associates, No 08-586, *9 (US
filed Sept 3, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 2896317) ("ICI Brief") (praising Gartenberg's
ability to weed out meritless claims before trial).
io Jones,527 F3d at 632.
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rule the industry likes less than the prevailing Gartenberg rule, or,
even worse, legislative action. (Better Gartenberg than Barney Frank.)
We can think of the Gartenberg rule as a "tax" on mutual fund profits,
and it may be rational for mutual fund advisers to prefer this very
small tax to the risk of a reconsideration of adviser pay generally, es-
pecially when they can simply pass on the tax to investors. Insofar as
the tax is small and random,"' no individual fund or the industry as a
whole should be bothered by the current rule. It should not be surpris-
ing, therefore, that the industry called for Gartenberg to be reinstated.H2
Easterbrook's opinion in Jones boldly tried to end this profitable
game by calling the bluff of the lawyers and the funds. The importance
of Jones lies in the fact that everyone involved-the advisers, the
courts, the lawyers-was fine with the existing regime. But the inves-
tors § 36(b) was designed to help were not helped by it, and what Eas-
terbrook tried to do in Jones was protect them from the costs that
§ 36(b) litigation passes on.
Easterbrook's opinion, which essentially is about collapsing the
merits inquiry into the motion to dismiss stage, also points to the dan-
ger of the federalization of corporate law issues generally. As noted
above, state courts are much better at processing fiduciary duty claims
efficiently."' Delaware courts have a long tradition of collapsing litiga-
tion in this way, through mechanisms like the demand-excuse doctrine
and expert courts that are able to efficiently sort meritorious from
meritless cases and are willing to dismiss metitless cases quickly. Sec-
tion 36(b) and state fiduciary duty law on executive compensation are
nearly indistinguishable, and yet state courts are not subjected to the
same strike suits that federal courts have been. This may be because
federal.courts apply the pleading and discovery rules similarly across
substantive areas out of a fear that balkanizing the rules risks dismiss-
ing cases that would vindicate important rights. Whereas the specia-
lized Delaware business courts can apply merits-collapsing rules in
corporate law cases without risk of deterring tort or civil rights suits,
the same might not be true of federal courts. If true, then we should
resist attempts to bring more corporate law matters under the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts.
This concern may be ameliorated to some extent by the Supreme
Court's recent civil procedure jurisprudence. We can view Twornbly
and Iqbal as attempts by the Supreme Court to delineate some stan-
111 There is some evidence that the suits are not random, but are correlated with asset
inflows. See notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
112 ICI Brief at *6-9 (cited in 109) (arguing that the Gartenberg framework has produced "a
remarkably stable and cohesive body of law that has provided welcome guidance").
113 See notes 65-69,99-101, and accompanying text.
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dards for targeting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in particular
substantive areas, based on the external forces and incentives of the
litigants and third parties. Antitrust and national security issues are
already identified as areas in which federal courts should be attuned
to the tradeoffs between the costs of litigation and the information
needed to make good decisions."' Judge Easterbrook's opinion in
Jones suggested that mutual fund adviser compensation is one of these
areas too. It is too bad the Supreme Court didn't listen.
114 See Twombly, 550 US at 558-59; Iqbal, 129 S Ct at 1953.
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